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European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) exists as long as individual member states 
support collaborative defense. The matter of ESDP raises many questions such as: is it nec-
essary, does it truly help further the EU’s mission of peace through diplomacy, should it 
be reformed, is it cost effective? These are all good inquiries but there is a more prevalent 
concern, one that threatens the very life-line of ESDP, the current economic crisis. In light 
of the 2008 economic crisis, have member states’ attitudes toward ESDP changed in favor 
of pooled resources and capability sharing under the EU framework or are member states 
turning away from a common European defense policy? Many intellectuals fear this crisis 
will lead member states to cut back on military spending, thus limiting support for collab-
orative defense programs. Such a change would render ESDP incapable of promoting the 
EU’s security interests abroad, diminishing any gains European defense policy has made over 
the past decade (Valasek, 2009). In November of 2010 France and Britain formed a bilateral 
agreement on security and defense cooperation intentionally sidestepping ESDP. Their rea-
soning behind the arrangement was that this would be a more efficient way to cut military 
costs and free up money to pay back debts (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010). This 
seems to legitimize the concern that the economic crisis will stifle member state cooperation 
with ESDP. Then again, the financial crisis could be the best thing to happen to European 
collaborative defense. The Baltic States have used collaborative defense programs to protect 
their own national and regional security on lesser finances, saving money by pooling re-
sources through ESDP. Collaborative programs made available through ESDP would help 
get rid of unneeded national forces, freeing up funds that had previously been consumed 
by personnel and operational costs (Keohane & Valasek, 2008; NATO, 2010). This essay will 
explore two opposing answers to the above question that will hopefully determine whether 
the economic crisis is spurring (i.e. the Baltics), or undercutting (i.e. the UK and France), 
EU defense collaboration.
Theoretical Expectations
The first answer is that current economic conditions have changed member state pref-
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erence in greater favor of EU defense policy. With tighter military budgets, governments see 
pooling resources as a way to save money while maintaining national security. The second 
answer claims the opposite - current economic conditions have changed member state pref-
erence away from EU defense policy. In this scenario, governments see pooling as inefficient, 
not generating enough monetary incentive to justify continuing with collaborative spending. 
These two theories are founded on the assumption that economic interest is a factor in 
shaping ESDP. In actuality there are several factors that play a role in directing ESDP reform. 
Jolyon Howorth outlined four main drivers that in 1998 helped lead to cooperation among 
member states in regards to reforming ESDP. These factors are: 1) The end of the Cold War 
and the diminishing political and military significance of European security to the US; 2) 
The rebirth of the concept of “international community” and the need of international 
collaboration to protect national interest; 3) The reappearance of military conflict on the 
continent of Europe and the fact that Europe could not put an end to the conflicts without 
NATO’s help; and, 4) The aspiration of the EU to emerge as a political, not just economic, 
actor in the world (Howorth, 2007). Today these drivers still direct ESDP, but the main focus 
of the essay will be whether changes in fiscal security, due to the economic crisis, are affect-
ing ESDP.  
Economic interests are a key factor in explaining EU member states’ cooperation in 
defense policies. In some cases cooperating with ESDP can open new markets. In other cases 
defense policies might limit countries from entering new markets. When a state’s economic 
interests and security interests coincide it is more likely to support ESDP. For example, at the 
time of the collapse of the USSR, German businesses were the largest investors in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Germany had both an economic and strategic interest in promoting 
the development of stable markets, on the one hand to protect business interests and, on the 
other hand, to stabilize a region that might turn toward civil war in the wake of new inde-
pendence (Hix, 2005). Supporting EU defense policies opened and protected new markets 
for Germany. Current economic conditions have turned member state preference in favor 
of EU defense policy because the economic and security interests of the state correspond. 
Economic interests may not include protecting out-of-state markets like in the example of 
Germany. Rather, the state, seeking to rebound as quickly as possible, sees ESDP as a way 
to save money on military expenditures by pooling resources. Money the state saves from 
combined security can then be allocated toward public spending initiatives. In this way, the 
state maintains its security while improving its economic situation. The author tends to agree 
more with this theory.   
Conversely, the theory of economic interest also argues that, in some situations, col-
lective economic interests override security concerns. This happens when security concerns 
and economic interests clash. For example, if a state must choose between free trade and 
protecting a security interest, government will choose free trade if a large portion of voters 
is employed in globally competitive markets. In this situation, current economic conditions 
have changed preference away from EU defense policy because the concern for economic 
stability is greater than furthering ESDP. Even before the economic crisis, growing health-
care costs and the increasing number of elderly had the generous social-welfare nets of EU 
member states stretched thin. National capitals were pushing for shifting more EU spending 
to domestic economic programs. In short, ESDP was expensive before the economic crisis 
and is more expensive now because it takes funds away from domestic programs (Anderson, 
2008). Money that may possibly be saved by pooling resources under ESDP does not gener-
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ate enough of a monetary incentive to justify collaborative spending.
Military spending reports and foreign policy declarations will be used to determine 
where a country is focusing its funds and for what purposes. If a major foreign policy initia-
tive is to improve ESDP, then projected spending should show an increase in funding for 
ESDP programs.  Data from economically hard hit member states and states that fared fairly 
well will be compared to see if there was a significant difference between how each reacted 
to the economic crisis in regards to ESDP spending. 
The following section will present statistical information on member states and mili-
tary spending with the hope of determining how much spending is going toward pooled 
resource programs. “Significant” is a term that will be used to describe the importance of a 
given statistic.  For military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, any changes of one tenth 
of a percent will be considered nonsignificant changes. In regards to defense and collabora-
tive spending, any number above 10% will be considered significant. Support for ESDP is 
not measured by how much funding a country contributes in comparison to others, but in 
comparison to itself through changes in spending from year to year. Large economies like 
the UK have more resources to give than smaller economies like Estonia. Capacity to give is 
not always congruent with willingness.    
For the theory based on concurring interests to be correct, data should show that those 
EU member states who have suffered the most in terms of loss in GDP from the economic 
crisis are using more of their military budgets for collaborative resource programs. For the 
theory founded on conflicting interests to be correct, data should show these member states 
reallocating military spending away from collaborative EU defense programs. The purpose of 
limiting the qualification to those nations who have experienced the greatest amount of loss 
is to differentiate between which countries might or might not have the larger incentive to 
use resource pooling to save money. Countries with a more stable reaction to the economic 
crisis are likely to have more options in allocating money to boost public spending.
Quantitative Data
To begin we must first determine which member states fared the worst during the 
crisis. The CIA World Factbook contains information on GDP in terms of purchasing power 
parity, official exchange rate, real growth rate, and per capita income for each country in the 
EU. To gain a truly accurate reading on the economic situation of the member states would 
involve a combination of percentages from all of those categories. Such an in-depth analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this essay. Therefore, out of the four statistics given for GDP, real 
growth rate will be used as the measurement for resolving which states are doing better and 
which states are doing worse economically. Real growth rate is a better overall summary of 
the economic state of a country because it isn’t susceptible to possible inflation misreading. 
The following table is a summary of the information from 2007 to 2009.  
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TABLE 1
Member State 2007 2008 2009 Diff. Member 
State
2007 2008 2009 Diff.
Poland 6.8 5.1 1.7 -5.1 Germany 2.5 1.3 -4.7 -7.2
Malta 3.8 2 -1.2 -5 Bulgaria 6.2 6 -5 -11.2
Belgium 2.8 0.8 -1.5 -4.3 UK 2.7 -0.1 -5 -7.7
Cyprus 5.1 3.6 -1.5 -6.6 Italy 1.4 -1.3 -5.1 -6.5
Greece 4.5 2 -2 -6.5 Sweden 3.4 -0.6 -5.1 -8.5
France 2.3 0.1 -2.5 -4.8 Hungary 1 0.6 -6.3 -7.3
Portugal 1.9 0 -2.6 -4.5 Ireland 6 1 -7.6 -13.6
Spain 3.6 0.9 -3.7 -7.3 Romania 6.3 7.1 -7.1 -13.4
Austria 3.4 1.8 -3.9 -7.3 Finland 4.9 1.2 -8.1 -13
Netherlands 3.9 1.9 -3.9 -7.8 Slovenia 6.8 3.5 -8.1 -14.9
Luxembourg 6.5 0 -4.1 -10.6 Estonia 7.2 -3.6 -13.9 -21.1
Czech Republic 6.1 2.5 -4.3 -10.4 Lithuania 9.8 2.8 -14.8 -24.6
Slovakia 10.6 6.2 -4.7 -15.3 Latvia 10 -4.6 -18 -28
Denmark 1.7 -0.9 -4.7 -6.4
*Real Growth Rate in percentage from CIA World Factbook and State Department Background Notes
     
The trouble with using this statistic is that some might look at only the results of 2009, 
see negative numbers, and make a conclusion based on which country is more in the nega-
tive. With just this information it looks like the larger economies of Germany and the UK 
have been hit by the economic crisis much harder than Cyprus or Greece. It also seems that 
Poland has fared the best from the financial crisis, it went from 6.8 % in 2007 to 1.7% in 
2009.  
To avoid improper conclusions and to improve accuracy, the final column following 
each member state is the real growth rate from 2009 subtracted by the real growth rate of 
2007. With this new information the data shows that actually Belgium was the country that 
fared the best, not Poland. The difference between 2007 and 2009 was -4.3 for Belgium and 
-5.1 for Poland. Also, this added information reveals that the seeming disparity between Cy-
prus and Greece and the UK and Germany is only at most a difference of one point. Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia are the three countries that experienced the most negative economic 
growth. The difference in real growth rate from 2007 to 2009 was -21.1 for Estonia, -24.6 
for Lithuania, and -28 for Latvia.  
There was some concern for inaccurate estimates on the CIA website. For this reason 
the numbers of real growth rate for 2009 were compared to U.S. State Department statistics. 
Small discrepancies in numbers existed between these two sources, but they were differ-
ences of a tenth of a percent. This was not enough of a dissimilarity to distrust the statistics. 
There appears to be a pattern in the data from region to region. Member states in Western 
Europe experienced negative economic growth below the average of the overall EU. The 
average difference between 2009 and 2007 was -10.3. Those member states in Eastern and 
some in Central Europe were above the average, like Slovakia which had a growth of -15.3. 
Therefore, the author predicts that further research will show Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 
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the three with the most negative growth, as making drastic changes in its support of ESDP. 
Perhaps changes in pooling for these small, embattled Baltic States are due more to fear of 
Russia rather than economic hardship. This possible explanation will be discussed further 
on in the essay. As a comparison, it is suspected that Western European countries like the 
UK, France, and Germany, having fared far better in the economic crisis, have not made any 
changes. From this point on, research will center on these six member states.  
Table 2 is a list of military spending as a percentage of GDP for all EU members from 
2000 to 2008. Percentages have remained relatively constant for each state with intermittent 
changes of only a tenth of a percent. The UK, France, and Germany had no real change in 
military spending for the given time period. Estonia had a slight upward trend in spending 
whereas Lithuania showed a minor pattern downward. Latvia had no consistent trend of up 
or down. The difference in spending from 2000 to 2008 shows that there is some fluctuation 
from year to year, but there was no substantial change in expenditures overall as a direct result 
of the financial crisis. 
       
TABLE 2: As Percentage of GDP 
Member State 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Austria 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1
Belgium 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
Bulgaria 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.9 3 2.8
Cyprus 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.4 3
Czech Republic 1.3 1.5 1.7 2 1.9 2.1 2 1.9 2
Denmark 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5
Estonia 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4
Finland 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3
France 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5
Germany 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5
Greece 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.3
Hungary 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7
Ireland 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Italy 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1 0.9
Lithuania 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.7
Luxembourg n/a 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6
Malta 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Netherlands 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Poland 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8
Portugal 2 2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2 2 2 2
Romania 1.5 1.6 1.8 2 2 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5
Slovakia 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.7
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6Slovenia 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1
Spain 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Sweden 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 2
UK 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4
*The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
There is a possibility that governments had little time between 2007 and 2008 to re-
form military spending in response to the crisis. This could account for the lack of change in 
military spending during this time period. To verify the initial conclusion that the economic 
crisis has not affected overall government spending on the military, it is better to look at 
more recent information from 2009. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
(SIPRI) 2010 Yearbook reports, based on information in 2009, that: 
The effect of the global economic crisis on military expenditure in Europe var-
ied. In Western Europe, the recent trend of flat or slightly rising spending was 
largely unchanged, as governments chose to sustain public spending to boost the 
economy. However, in Central and Eastern Europe - where in many cases the cri-
sis has struck economies harder and where governments had insufficient reserves 
and levels of credit-worthiness to maintain large deficits - a number of countries 
made significant cuts to military spending as a direct result of the crisis, includ-
ing Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. 
Some of the richer Central European countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland - increased spending (Yearbook, 2010).
The economic crisis has had more of an effect on the military spending of those states 
whose economies were struck hardest. Whether this led to an emphasis on collaborative pro-
grams or not for Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania will require an analysis of how each of these 
states allocated funding to different projects within their individual military budget. Even in 
Western Europe, where spending remained relatively the same, leaders might still have real-
located funding toward programs focused on ESDP. The following information will appear 
to contradict the SIPRI data for 2008. The reader must remember that the above statistics 
were a conclusion of military spending as a whole whereas the following numbers focus on 
which specific areas had changes. Funds can be reallocated between projects without affect-
ing the overall sum.
The European Defense Agency (EDA) submitted a report on member states’ defense 
data for 2008. This report was useful in showing percentage changes in specific military 
spending areas from 2007 to 2008. Only six member states spent less on defense; among 
them was the UK. It decreased defense spending by 17%. Germany and France had little 
change, a positive 2%. During this period defense expenditures in Estonia had increased by 
17%, in Latvia by 14%, and in Lithuania by 10% (see Graph 1). Within the overall military 
spending percentages of the SIPRI data that remained relatively unchanged for EU member 
states, the three Western countries managed to maintain more or less the same level of na-
tional military spending from 2007 to 2008 or decrease it by over 10 percent. As for the three 
Eastern countries, each reallocated funds to bolster national defense. Percentage changes in 
the category of Investment of Equipment Procurement and R&D seem to explain where 
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certain member states are spending a portion of their overall defense expenditures. Estonia 
increased investment 47% and Germany 35%. Surprisingly, Latvia boosted its investment of 
equipment procurement 109%. On the other hand, Lithuania decreased investment 9%, the 
UK 14%, and France 1%.
GRAPH 1: Percentage Change in Defense Expenditure from 2007-2008
*European Defense Agency 2008 Defense Data Report
When it came to spending on collaborative European programs, the numbers from the 
EDA report showed less drastic changes. Lithuania’s spending toward collaborative equip-
ment procurement went from 5% in 2007 to 3.4% in 2008. The UK’s spending also went 
down from 21.3% to 19.8%, as well as Germany’s from 18.9% to 13.1% (see Graph 2). Only 
two of the EU member states actually increased collaborative equipment procurement be-
tween 2007 and 2008. France increased spending by 10% and Italy by 14.3%. There were no 
figures given on Latvia or Estonia. As for European collaborative spending on Research and 
Technology (R&T), a subset of R&D, Estonia went from 21% in 2007 to 11% in 2008, but 
France and Germany increased slightly from 16% to 18% and 19% to 22%. No percentages 
were given for the UK, Latvia or Lithuania. Lastly, while the percentage change in average 
number of troops deployed for EU missions increased by 14.7% in Estonia and 5% in France, 
Lithuania’s average number decreased by 2.8% and the UK’s by 2.3% (European Defense 
Agency, 2008). 
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GRAPH 2: European Collaborative Equipment Procurement as a Percentage
*European Defense Agency 2008 Defense Data Report       
 
What all these percentages show is that among the Western European countries there 
was no large increase in national defense spending around the time of the economic crisis. In 
fact, in the UK there was a significant decrease. Spending on certain collaborative programs 
was less consistent as a regional whole. Germany spent less on collaborative equipment pro-
curement but increased slightly its contribution to collaborative R&T. The UK somewhat 
decreased spending on both weapon procurement and number of troops deployed. Changes 
in spending for these countries, however, were at the most a change in no more than 5% 
from the previous year, not enough to sustain a solid conclusion that their overall support 
for ESDP has changed. It appears that despite the economic crisis collaborative spending 
has remained the same for these countries. France on the other hand increased spending 
on weapons procurement, R&T, and the number of deployed troops. France consistently 
showed positive spending for collaborative programs.
Among the Eastern European countries there was an increase in national defense 
spending. As with Western Europe, results of collaborative program spending were less con-
sistent as a regional whole. No real conclusion on Latvia can be made because of the lack of 
evidence provided in the report for this country. However, Lithuania decreased both collab-
orative weapons procurement and number of deployable troops while Estonia spent less on 
weapons procurement but increased number of troops deployed to EU missions. Therefore, 
a distinguishable pattern of behavior toward ESDP spending for those countries hardest hit 
by the economic crisis is vague, if not nonexistent, for the time period. 
A Defense Data Report for 2009 didn’t offer any updates on individual state spending 
but it did provide overall EU defense spending. In summary, the report shows a slight upward 
pattern in EU collaboration programs. Chart 1 is an example of the information provided in 
the report. From 2006 to 2009 European and national collaborative equipment procurement 
hasn’t fluctuated greatly. At least some significant change from before the economic crisis to 
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now was expected, but overall member state spending is remaining consistent. The quanti-
tative data in this section is useful in outlining how military spending changed during the 
onset of the economic crisis up till 2009. Based on this information alone it would seem that 
there is no need to fear that the economic crisis will harm ESDP. These statistics have done 
little to help illuminate whether member states decisions are being driven by correspond-
ing or conflicting economic and security interests. The following section will address more 
qualitative examples of what’s causing the six selected member states reactions to ESDP.
CHART 1: National and Collaborative Equipment Procurement in Percentages
*EDA Defense Data 2009
Qualitative Data   
Around the same time as the information gathered in this report, conflict between 
Georgia and Russia erupted. This may explain the increase in national defense spending 
on the EDA report. Fearing a resurgence of Russian imperialism, the Baltic States indi-
vidually increased defense. Therefore, it was the threat of Russia, not the economic crisis, 
which caused the change in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia’s support of collaborative ESDP 
programs.
However, according to Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country’s accession to 
the EU and NATO has brought it more security than it has ever experienced. Membership 
has diminished traditional military threats against the state, allowing greater opportunities for 
Latvia to focus on development and the shaping of its foreign policy. One of Latvia’s main 
objectives is to help strengthen ESDP as a way to build relations with other countries and 
thereby increase economic possibilities (Foreign Policy Guidelines, 2010).  
The fear of Russian imperialism has been quelled by the accession of the Baltic States 
into the EU and NATO. These states see themselves as more or less protected from take-over 
and are able to focus their efforts not on military defense, but on economic development. 
Even if these countries felt a legitimate threat from Russia, “the military capacities of the 
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Baltic States, as well as financial and human resources, are too scarce to be able to indepen-
dently neutralize the threats” (Molis 2008, 11). This creates a large incentive for the state to 
integrate into the global organizations ensuring security and stability where the country is 
lacking (Molis, 2008).  Thus, because of its military, economic and human resource weakness 
the Baltic States joined NATO and the EU for protection.  
The efficiency of this type of defense alliance primarily depends on the level and na-
ture of threats. As threats to the region increase, dependence on the alliance increases (Molis, 
2008). Therefore, the Georgia-Russia conflict would have only increased Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia’s support of collaborative programs under ESDP. One of Estonia’s objectives as 
a member of the EU is to persistently pursue an active development co-operation policy 
(National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia). In a formal address to the Estonian 
parliament, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Sven Mikser reviewed important 
areas in foreign policy where the government should focus. He states “Estonia must take a 
firm stand in all international organizations… I can assure that the foreign delegations of 
[parliament] have done efficient work in all essential parliamentary assemblies to keep this 
significant issue in focus” (The Parliament of Estonia, 2010). This statement was in regards 
to Georgia and South-Ossetia. Regional conflict in Eastern Europe is only emphasizing, not 
diminishing, support for international organizations and programs like ESDP.    
The EDA showed an increase in defense spending for the Baltic States, but this doesn’t 
mean that this type of spending is taking away from ESDP. Lithuania’s Defense Budget has 
a fund for international operations (abbreviated OI by the Ministry of National Defense). 
5.4% of the overall budget in 2008 was spent on OI. In 2009 the percentage was slightly less, 
4.7% but this is a difference of only 0.7 (Ministry of National Defense). The SIPRI Yearbook 
reports that these countries have made significant cuts to military spending as a direct result 
of the crisis. I have not been able to find data on where these cuts were made, but from 
the information in the EDA report for 2008 funds were not taken from collaborative EU 
programs. According to foreign policy documents Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia seem eager 
to continue developing ESDP. What is causing this support, however, may not be economic 
in nature, but defensive. Regardless, economic interests have coincided with security inter-
ests. The Baltic States rely on ESDP and other defense alliances to provide security while 
state leaders focus attention on economic development. Recent developments between two 
Western European countries, however, suggest that economic and security interests are at 
odds within this region.
On November 2, 2010 France and Britain made a bilateral agreement on security and 
defense cooperation. Media claimed the decision was based on budget concerns. Britain 
was looking for a way to reduce its 36 billion pound defense budget deficit while France 
was looking for a way to facilitate a similar program of cuts it proposed in 2008. These two 
governments are pooling their resources in order to save money, but they are doing so out-
side of ESDP. Paris and London could have carried out the collaboration projects outlined 
in the agreement within the EU framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation, but 
the conscious decision to negate this step sends other member states the message that these 
countries hold low expectations for EU defense cooperation. The agreement was extended 
to Germany, but it did not accept and was given the responsibility to stop France and Britain 
from withdrawing completely from CSDP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010).  
Ten days after the announcement of Franco-Britain bilateralism European Defense 
Ministers announced the EDA would enhance activities on pooling and sharing of national 
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military capabilities. These offer potential for saving money while increasing security capa-
bilities. Catherine Ashton, Head of the EDA, stated that the Agency was reacting to the needs 
of the Ministers who were “looking for opportunities to work closely together in order to 
improve capabilities while budgets are under pressure” (EDA Press Release). In addition to 
existing projects, the EDA discussed developing pooling and sharing in areas like medical 
support, naval logistics, and satellite communications. The last two of these areas were part of 
the Franco-Britain agreement.  
Analysis
Quantitative data helped outline how states have suffered in terms of real growth rate 
in GDP and revealed a pattern: Western Europe, as a whole, fared better than Eastern Europe. 
This pattern is obvious even without statistics, but the information was useful in determining 
which specific member states were hit hardest by the economic crisis in terms of growth. 
The point in finding this data was to establish which member states may have had a greater 
incentive to continue with ESDP because of economic hardship. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
ania were the three who experienced the most negative growth.  
Overall military spending for EU members remained relatively unchanged from 2000 
to 2008. By 2009, however, Eastern and Central European countries had decreased military 
spending while Western Europe remained constant. According to the SIPRI report, this 
change was due to the economic crisis. The next series of statistics taken from the EDA 
Defense Data for 2008 showed where changes in military spending had been made for 
collaborative European defense programs. It was anticipated that this information would 
give some direction on where the selected member states were emphasizing their spend-
ing, thereby highlighting which security programs were most important to that state. The 
results showed that Western European countries were maintaining the same level of defense 
spending as before 2008, with the UK actually spending significantly less. Eastern European 
countries actually increased national defense spending. As for collaborative programs, the six 
states didn’t follow a regional pattern. Only Estonia and France showed a significant change 
in certain program spending, with the latter increasing its emphasis on troop deployment 
while reducing its funding toward R&T. The remaining four showed little variation from 
2007 to 2008 on collaborative programs spending.  
Overall spending on European defense between 2006 and 2009 shows a slight upward 
pattern in EU collaboration programs. Member state spending is remaining consistent even 
after the initial financial blow caused by the economic crisis. Despite reallocation of military 
funds within the UK, France, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania ESDP spending is not 
suffering at the moment. More recent information on a breakdown in program spending for 
2009 was desired, but for the time being it does not exist. Therefore there is a limit to the 
ability of the EDA data to explain how member states are responding to the economic crisis 
in regards to ESDP. Just as information for overall military spending showed one thing for 
2008 and another for 2009 so too might a breakdown in program spending.
Qualitative information was then used to try to correct this limitation. Reactions to the 
crisis by heads of state would help explain what member states were doing more recently. For 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia support for ESDP continues. This support, however, may be 
less founded on the economic crisis and more centered on a desire to obtain regional stabil-
ity. On the other hand, the recent Franco-Britain bilateral security cooperation agreement 
shows that these countries are tired of Europe’s lack of military capability and are branching 
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out away from ESDP. Pooling and sharing offer France and Britain a way to cut defense 
budget deficits. The EDA is reacting to this by making plans to enhance pooling and sharing 
opportunities for member states within the framework of collaborative EU defense. 
Conclusion  
In the wake of the economic crisis, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have remained faith-
ful to ESDP. Membership in the EU has provided these states a level of security that their 
own economic and human resources could not. The Baltic States depend heavily on Euro-
pean markets and use ESDP as one way to maintain good standing and economic ties with 
other member states. Also, regional conflicts help to increase these states’ dependence on 
cooperative defense alliances. Economic interests have coincided with security interests. The 
current economic conditions in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia haven’t led to an increase in 
ESDP program spending, but it also hasn’t led to a substantial decrease. Support for EU de-
fense policy has remained the same. Therefore, theory one is incorrect - the economic crisis 
hasn’t increased member states’ preference in greater favor of ESDP.
Current economic conditions have changed the UK and France’s preferences away 
from EU defense policy. Both France and Britain were looking to cut deficits in their de-
fense budgets, but they felt that the EU defense framework was inadequate. From 2006 to 
2009 there was no statistical indication that these two would change their support for ESDP. 
In light of the 2010 bilateral agreement, theory two is correct - the economic crisis has 
changed member state preference away from EU defense policy.
In all reality, the reactions of member states toward ESDP differ depending on each 
individual nation. More qualitative research on every member of the EU would be best in 
determining overall how the economic crisis has affected ESDP spending reform. The quan-
titative data in this essay revealed that from the onset of the crisis until the bilateral agree-
ment, ESDP spending had gone unchanged. During this time the fear that member states 
would significantly decrease support of ESDP seemed irrational. Now, with the Franco-
Britain bilateralism, this fear is becoming reality but it is not the deathblow to ESDP. Defense 
ministers now have the opportunity and the incentive to reform the inefficient collaboration 
programs of the past. This essay has sought to offer the reader an answer to the question of 
whether the economic crisis has helped or harmed ESDP. The real answer won’t come for 
many more years and after much monitoring of member states, but this is a start. Now we 
know that from the onset of the crisis till November of 2010 ESDP and the economic crisis 
have neither been friend nor foe. Whether this relationship changes within the coming years 
is a research design for another day.   
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